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Abstract
By incorporating market impact and asymmetric sensitivity into the evolu-
tionary minority game, we study the coevolutionary dynamics of stock prices
and investment strategies in financial markets. Both the stock price move-
ment and the investors’ global behavior are found to be closely related to the
phase region they fall into. Within the region where the market impact is
small, investors’ asymmetric response to gains and losses leads to the occur-
rence of herd behavior, when all the investors are prone to behave similarly in
an extreme way and large price fluctuations occur. A linear relation between
the standard deviation of stock price changes and the mean value of strate-
gies is found. With full market impact, the investors tend to self-segregate
into opposing groups and the introduction of asymmetric sensitivity leads to
the disappearance of dominant strategies. Compared with the situations in
the stock market with little market impact, the stock price fluctuations are
suppressed and an efficient market occurs. Theoretical analyses indicate that
the mechanism of phase transition from clustering to self-segregation in the
present model is similar to that in the majority-minority game and the occur-
rence and disappearance of efficient markets are related to the competition
between the trend-following and the trend-aversion forces. The clustering of
the strategies in the present model results from the majority-wins effect and
the wealth-driven mechanism makes the market become predictable.
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1. Introduction
Since Alfred Marshall, exploring the functional form of market impact
has been a laboring but valuable task for economists[1]. More recently, to
elucidate the discrepancy between the stock price shaped by excess demand
and the actual transaction price, econophysicists have also got involved in the
research of the roles of market impact in the evolution of stock prices[2, 3, 4].
Their work has opened a new window for the study of complex behaviors in
financial markets[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
The market impact reflected in the increase and decrease of stock prices
only tells us whether an excess demand exists or not, but not how it comes.
Over the last decade, inspired by the findings in psychology that negative
information should weigh more heavily on the brain than positive informa-
tion, the roles of asymmetric sensitivity in the stock price performance have
been studied by scientists[12, 13, 14, 15]. It has been found that the in-
vestors often exhibit asymmetric responses to positive (gain) and negative
(loss) information[16, 17]. They are prone to overreact to bad news and un-
derreact to good news[18, 19]. Such an effect may result in the change of the
excess demand in the stock market.
To have a deep understanding of the evolutionary dynamics in finan-
cial markets, some agent-based models have been introduced in modeling
the strategic interactions between the investors[20, 21, 22]. Among them,
the minority game (MG) provides us a simple yet effective way to model
the evolution of stock prices[23, 24, 25, 26]. In the MG, the evolutionary
mechanism is determined by two main factors: the global information and
the individual strategy. At each time step, each agent makes a buying or
a selling decision depending upon the historical price information and his
own trading strategy. After all the agents have made their decisions, the
stock price is updated according to the excess demand. To get more bene-
fits in the investment, an agent will learn from his past mistakes and choose
the best-performing strategy from his strategy pool as his decision-making
strategy[27, 28, 29, 30]. Similar to the crowd-anticrowd problem in the MG,
the herd behavior has also been studied in another repeated game, known as
the Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) problem[31, 32, 33]. Different from the
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two-choice competition in the MG, a macroscopic size of choices is considered
in the KPR.
In the original MG, the individual strategy is a discontinuous variable.
In exploring for the evolutionary mechanism of the strategies, it is somewhat
difficult to give the descriptive nature of the strategies depending upon such
a variable. As an extension of the original MG, the evolutionary minor-
ity game (EMG) introduced by Johnson et al has incorporated continuous
strategy sets into the MG. With such a continuous variable, the descriptive
nature of the strategies is easy to be reflected, i.e. by the distribution or
the standard deviation of the individual strategies[35, 36, 37, 38, 39]. In the
EMG, the individual strategy is represented by a probability g ∈ [0, 1]. In
the decision making, an agent follows the outcome which can be predicted
from the historical information with probability g and does the opposite with
probability 1− g. An individual’s strategy evolves according to its score. If
the score of the strategy is below a threshold, it is modified within a certain
range. The coevolutionary mechanism of the strategies and the stock prices
in the EMG provides us more observable variables in the study of the market
movement.
Although the roles of the market impact in the evolution of the stock
prices have been widely discussed, both the coupled effect of the market
impact and the asymmetric sensitivity and the coevolutionary mechanism
of the individual strategies and the stock prices are still short of in-depth
understandings. To address the coevolutionary mechanism of the individual
strategies and the stock prices under different environmental conditions, in
the present model, we incorporate the market impact and the asymmetric
sensitivity into the EMG. The major findings of the present study are as
follows.
(1) The change of the market impact parameter β can effectively affect
the distribution of individual strategies. There exists a critical point βc,
below which the population tend to become clustering and above which the
population tend to self-segregate into opposing groups.
(2) Both the individual strategy and the stock price are closely related to
an individual’s asymmetric response to gains and loses. With little market
impact, the introduction of the asymmetry sensitivity leads to the occurrence
of a single dominant strategy and a large price fluctuation. A linear relation
between the standard deviation of the stock price changes and the average
value of the strategies is found. With full market impact, the asymmetry
sensitivity only leads to the disappearance of the dominant strategies but
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not the stability of the stock prices.
(3) Theoretical analyses show that the occurrence of large price fluctua-
tions is related to the majority-winning effect while the suppression of the
large price fluctuations is related to the minority-winning effect. Under the
conditions where market impact is small, the market movement is predictable
and the agents in the majority wins. Large price fluctuations are easy to oc-
cur in such a system. With full market impact, the market movement is
unpredictable and the agents in the minority wins. The stock price is some-
what stable and an efficient market is easy to occur in such a system.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the evolutionary minor-
ity game with market impact and asymmetric sensitivity is introduced. In
Section 3, the simulation results of the coevolution of individual strategies
and stock prices is presented and the roles of the market impact and the
asymmetric sensitivity are discussed. In Section 4, the mechanisms for the
movement of the dominant strategies is analyzed theoretically. The conclu-
sions and an outlook of future studies are given in Section 5.
2. The model
We consider a model of N agents repeatedly trading in the stock market.
Each agent has a trading strategy, also called gene value g. At each time step,
each agent makes a decision of buying (+1), selling (-1) or taking a holding
position (0) according to the previous m outcomes of price movement and
his trading strategy. For example, we use the symbols of ↑ and ↓ as the rise
and the fall of the stock prices respectively. For m = 3, (↑↑↑)↓ represents
the history in the memory, which means the price movement is down after
three steps of rise. Faced with the global information ↑↑↑, the agent with
strategy g will make his decision following the prediction ↓ with probability g
and rejecting the prediction with probability 1− g. After all the agents have
made their decisions, the stock price is updated according to the equation
P (t+ 1) = P (t) + sgn[A(t)]
√
| A(t) |, (1)
in which A(t) =
∑N
i=1 ai(t), ai(t) is the decision of agent i[7, 40]. At a given
time, if there are more buyers than sellers, the stock price increases. If there
are more sellers than buyers, the stock price decreases. The price information
is stored in each agent’s memory, which helps him make his prediction of the
price movement in the next time steps.
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In the real financial market, the excess demand has more or less effect on
the transaction prices. In the present model, the market impact is reflected
in the transaction price, which is defined as[7]
Ptr(t) = (1− β)P (t) + βP (t+ 1), (2)
in which the variable β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) is used to measure the degree of the
market impact. For β = 0, the transaction price becomes Ptr(t) = P (t),
which indicates that the transaction price contains no market impact and is
determined by the immediate price. For β = 1, the transaction price becomes
Ptr(t) = P (t + 1), which indicates that the transaction price contains full
market impact and is determined by the next price.
Each agent’s strategy is modified according to the strategy score d, which
is defined as an accumulated value of gains and losses after the strategy has
been adopted.
d+ =
T+max∑
T+=1
[Ptr(tsell)− Ptr(tbuy)]T+ , (3)
d− =
T−max∑
T−=1
[Ptr(tsell)− Ptr(tbuy)]T− , (4)
d = d+ +Rd−, (5)
in which T+max and T
−
max are the transaction times corresponding to the cases
of Ptr(tsell) ≥ Ptr(tbuy) and Ptr(tsell) < Ptr(tbuy) respectively after the strategy
has been adopted. R(≥ 1) is the ratio demonstrating whether the asymmet-
ric sensitivity exists or not. When R = 1, the agents have the symmetric
sensitivity to gains and loses. When R > 1, the agents have the asymmetric
sensitivity and overreact to loses. There exists a predefined threshold D, if
d < D, a new strategy is chosen from [g− ε, g+ ε] with an equal probability
and the strategy score is reset to d = 0. In the present model, the option to
hold a position, that is, a decision of taking no buying or selling actions, is
included in each agent’s strategy g. For example, facing a global information
that selling is beneficial, if an agent has a stock in his hand, he will sell it
with probability g and take no action with probability 1−g. If the agent has
no stock in his hand, he will buy the stock with probability 1 − g and take
no action with probability g. Therefore, between the time when an agent
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takes an action of buying and the time when he takes an action of selling,
the agent holds a position. Such a mechanism is reflected in the equations
(3-4) where the period of time | tsell − tbuy | is closely related to the gains or
losses in each attempt.
In the evolution of individual strategies, the characteristics of the strat-
egy distribution P (g) can be represented by the standard deviation of the
strategies, which satisfies the equation
σg =
√
< g2 > − < g >2. (6)
A small σg implies that the agents tend to adopt the same strategy and the
population cluster around a specific strategy. The larger the value of σg, the
more dispersed the strategies.
The characteristics of the evolution of the stock prices can be represented
by the price fluctuations, which can also be reflected in the standard deviation
σP of the price changes within a period of time. σP is defined as
σP =
√
< δP 2 > − < δP >2. (7)
A large σP implies that the stock price is unstable and a large price fluctuation
occurs. In such conditions, an agent’s gains and loses depend upon whether
he can make an accurate prediction of the market movement or not. If he
can follow the movement of the market, he will attain more. If not, he will
lose more.
The predictability of the rise and the fall of the stock prices is quite im-
portant for the investors to get more benefits. Therefore, how to measure it
becomes an important work. Following the work done in [7], the predictabil-
ity of the stock prices is defined as
H =
2m−1∑
µ=0
ρ(µ) < δP | µ >2, (8)
in which µ is the possible state of the system, ρ(µ) is the probability of the
occurrence of µ and < δP | µ > is the conditional probability of the average
value of the price change. If the value of H is small, it implies that the price
change is unpredictable and the stock market is an efficient market. If the
value of H is large, it implies that the price change is predictable and the
stock market is an inefficient market.
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Figure 1: Strategy distribution P(g) with N = 101, m = 3, D = −4, (a) β = 0.2, R = 1
(circles), 2(squares), 5(triangles), and (b) β = 0.8, R = 1 (circles), 1.05 (squares), 5
(triangles). All the data are obtained by averaging over 100 runs and 1000 times after
100000 relaxation times in each run.
Another parameter corresponding to whether an agent can make an ac-
curate prediction of the rise and the fall of the stock prices is the winning
probability, which is defined as
PW =
∆TW
∆T
, (9)
in which ∆T is the statistical time window and ∆TW is the winning times
within it. In real society, an accurate prediction of the rise and the fall of the
stock prices may attract more people to participate actively in buying and
selling, which may lead to the occurrence of bubbles in the stock market.
3. Results and discussions
Figure 1 (a) and (b) show the long-time strategy distribution P (g) for
β = 0.2, 0.8 and different R. It is observed that the characteristics of the
strategies are closely related to the market impact parameter β and the
asymmetric sensitivity parameter R. For a small β = 0.2 and R = 1, the
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Figure 2: Standard deviation σg of strategy distribution as a function of β with N = 101,
m = 3, D = −4 and R = 1 (circles), 1.02 (squares), 1.05(diamonds), 1.2(triangles),
2(pluses), 5 (stars). All the data are obtained by averaging over 100 runs and 1000 times
after 100000 relaxation times in each run.
agents are prone to adopt the strategy g ∼ 0.5. Increasing R leads to the
increase or decrease of the dominant strategy. As we have an eye on the
unaveraged strategy distribution, we find that the g < 0.5 and g > 0.5
strategies can not coexist. Depending upon different initial conditions, there
exist a critical point g>c (> 0.5) or g
<
c (< 0.5), only the strategies g > g
>
c or
g < g<c are left in the final steady state for a specific run. Increasing R leads
to the increase of g>c and the decrease of g
<
c . For a large β = 0.8 and R = 1,
the agents are prone to self-segregate into opposing groups and a U-shape
P (g) distribution occurs. Increasing R leads to the decrease of the extreme
strategies of g = 0 and g = 1 and a uniform P (g) distribution is observed for
a big enough R.
Figure 2 displays the standard deviation σg of the strategy distribution
as a function of the market impact parameter β for different R. In all the
six cases, there exists a critical point βc ∼ 0.5. For β < βc and R = 1, σg
keeps a small value of σg ∼ 0.15. For β > βc and R = 1, σg keeps a large
value of σg ∼ 0.38. Increasing R leads to the decrease of σg within the range
of β < 0.5 and β > 0.5.
Figure 3 shows the stock price P (t) as a function of t for β = 0.2, 0.8
and different R. For a small value of market impact, i.e. β = 0.2, which cor-
responds to the regime where the population cluster around a specific value
of g in fig.1(a). In the situations where all the agents adopt the strategies
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Figure 3: Evolution of the stock price P (t) with N = 101, m = 3, D = −4, (a) β =0.2,
p < 0.5, R = 1(black), R = 5(red); (b) β =0.2, p > 0.5, R = 1(black), R = 5(red); (c)β
=0.8, R = 1(black), R = 1.05(red); (d)β =0.8, R = 1.2(black), R = 5(red).
g < g<c and the average value of the strategies satisfies g < 0.5, the stock
prices exhibit large fluctuations. In the situations where all the agents adopt
the strategies g > g>c and the average value of the strategies g > 0.5, the
stock prices exhibit zigzag oscillations. Increasing R leads to the occurrence
of a larger price fluctuation in both cases. For a large value of market impact,
i.e. β = 0.8, which corresponds to the regime where the strategy distribu-
tion changes from a U-shape to a uniform distribution in fig.1(b), the price
fluctuations also exit. But compared with the price fluctuations in fig. 3(a)
and (b), the oscillation amplitude becomes small. Incresing R has no obvious
effect on the change of the price fluctuations.
In figure 4 we plot the standard deviation σP of the stock price changes
as a function of the market impact parameter β for different R. Just as that
in fig.2, for all the three cases of R = 1, 2, and 5, there exists a critical
point βc ∼ 0.5. For R = 1 and βc < 0.5, σP keeps a large value of σp ∼ 5.
For R = 1 and βc > 0.5, σP keeps a small value of σp ∼ 1.8. Increasing R
leads to an obvious increase of σP within the range of β < 0.5 and has no
obvious effect on the change of σP within the range of β > 0.5. Comparing
the results in fig. 2 with the results in fig.4, we find that both the individual
strategies and the stock prices are affected by the market impact and the
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Figure 4: Standard deviation σP of the stock price changes as a function of β withN = 101,
m = 3, D = −4 and R = 1(circles), 2 (squares), 5 (triangles). All the data are obtained
by averaging over 100 runs and 1000 times after 100000 relaxation times in each run.
asymmetric sensitivity. Such results imply that there should be some close
relation between the evolution of the stock prices and the evolution of the
strategies in the present model.
To find out whether there exists a functional relation between the change
of the stock prices and the characteristics of the individual strategies, in fig.5
(a) and (b) we plot the standard deviation σP as a function of g¯ for β = 0.2.
The data in fig.5 (a) are obtained by averaging the runs in which all the
strategies satisfy g > g>c and the data in fig.5 (b) are obtained by averaging
the runs in which all the strategies satisfy g > g>c . From fig.5 we observe
that, in the conditions g¯ < 0.5, σP decreases linearly with the rise of g¯. In
the conditions g¯ > 0.5, σP increases linearly with the rise of g¯. When we give
fitted lines to the data in fig.5(a) and (b) respectively, we find they satisfy
the equation σp = ap¯ + b, in which a ∼ 6.9489, b ∼ −7.8047 in fig.5(a) and
a ∼ −4.2265 and b ∼ 15.093 in fig.5(b). Such results indicate that, with
little market impact, the evoltuion of the stock prices is closely related to the
distribution of individual strategies. Given one of them we may accurately
predict the other.
In fig.6 we give the predictability H as a function of R for different β.
As R increases from R = 0 to R = 11, for β = 0, H increases from H ∼ 18
to H ∼ 40. Increasing β has little effect on the change of H for R = 1 and
leads to an obvious increase of H for R = 11. Such results indicate that the
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Figure 5: Standard deviation σP of the stock price changes as a function of the average
value of the individual strategies g¯ with N = 101, m = 3, D = −4, β = 0.2. (a)g¯ < 0.5,
(b) g¯ > 0.5.
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Figure 6: Predictability H as a function of R with N = 101, m = 3, D = −4 and β
=0(circles), 0.2 (squares), 0.4 (triangles). All the data are obtained by averaging over 100
runs and 1000 times after 100000 relaxation times in each run.
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Figure 7: Winning probability PW (a) as a function of R and (b) as a function of H with
N = 101, m = 3, D = −4 and β =0(circles), 0.2 (squares), 0.4 (triangles). All the data
are obtained by averaging over 100 runs and 1000 times after 100000 relaxation times in
each run.
asymmetric sensitivity can effectively affect the movement of the market. In
an inefficient market, the asymmetric responses to gains and loses will lead to
the trend-following crowd effect and the evolution of the stock prices become
more predictable.
To find out whether the rise of predictability H is beneficial for an agent
to make an investment in the stock market, in fig.7 we plot the winning
probability as a function of R for different β. Just as that in fig.6, increasing
R can also effectively increase the winning probability. For β = 0, as R
increases from R = 1 to R = 11, PW accordingly increases from PW = 0.73
to PW = 0.91. Increasing β leads to an increase of PW for an intermediate R
but does not lead to an change of the maximum value of PW . Such results
indicate that, in a more predictable market, an investor is much easier to
achieve success.
4. Theoretical analysis
4.1. Phase transition from trend following to trend adverse
In the present model, the evolution of the system exhibits quite different
mechanisms below and above the critical point βc = 0.5. Below the criti-
cal point βc, the system will evolve into the state where most of the agents
adopt the same trading strategy and the stock price is unstable. But above
the critical point βc, the opposing groups are much easier to coexist and the
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stock price becomes stable. To theoretically understand the phase transition
mechanism in the present model, we firstly make a comparison between the
evolutionary mechanism in the minority game and the evolutionary mecha-
nism in the majority game.
As individuals are engaged in the two-state game involving many other
individuals, in the minority game, the agents in the minority group win. But
in the majority game, the agents in the majority group win. Depending upon
the evolutionary minority game, T.S.Lo et al have theoretically analyzed
the relationship between the efficiency of the market and the distribution of
individual strategies. The functional form of the strategy distribution has
been found[41], which satisfies
P (g) ∝ 11
2
− τ(g) , (10)
in which τ(g) ∼ 1
2
− 1√
N
g(1− g) is the winning probability of the agent with
strategy g. From the above equation we find that the strategy distribution is
closely related to the winning probability of different strategies. As g changes
from g = 0 to g = 1, τ(g) firstly decreases and then increases with the rise
of g. For g = 0 and g = 1, τ(g) reaches its maximum value of τ(g) ∼ 1
2
.
Therefore, P (k) exhibits a U-shape distribution within the range of g ∈ [0, 1].
Different from that in the minority game, in the majority game, the agents
following the crowd will win the game[42, 43]. On condition that the agents
do not interact, which corresponds to the situation where all the agents adopt
the same strategy g = 1
2
in the EMG, the difference between the number of
agents in the majority group and the number of agents in the minority group
should satisfy the relation A ∼ √N [42]. In the majority game, a macroscopic
difference between the numbers of agents in different states should be A = N ,
which corresponds to the situation where all the agents make their decisions
following or rejecting the historical price information in the EMG. There-
fore, in the majority game, the strategy distribution should refrain from a
symmetric distribution or clustering around g = 1
2
.
Then, we will give a comparison of the evolutionary processes below and
above the critical point βc = 0.5. The evolutionary mechanism exists in the
minority game and the evolutionary mechanism exists in the majority game
are both found in the present model.
For the extreme case of β = 0. From the transaction price equation,
Ptr(t) = (1−β)P (t)+βP (t+1), we can obtain Ptr(t) = P (t), which indicates
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that, for a particular agent i, his winning probability should be determined by
the instant price. Because each agent has known the instant price before he
makes his decision, each agent should know of whether a buying or a selling
decision in the next time step is beneficial for him or not. In such a case, the
stock market becomes predictable and each agent can make good decisions
according to the global information. Therefore, the majority-win situation
found in the majority game will occur for β = 0. For example, facing the
global information ↑↑↑ and the history-dependent prediction ↑↑↑↓, if most
of the agents follow the prediction and sell the stocks, the stock price in the
next time step decreases and the sellers win the game. If most of the agents
reject the prediction and buy the stocks, the stock price in the next time step
increases and the buyers win the game. Therefore, whether the agents make
a decision of buying or selling, those in the majority win.
For the extreme case of β = 1. From the transaction price equation we
obtain Ptr(t) = P (t + 1), which indicates that, for a particular agent i, his
winning probability should be determined by the next price. Because each
agent does not know the next price before he makes his dicision, each agent
has no idea about whether a buying or a selling decision is beneficial for him
or not. In such a case, it becomes difficult for each agent to make an accurate
prediction of the market movement and the evolutionary mechanism is like
that in the minority game. For example, facing the global information ↑↑↑
and the history-dependent prediction ↑↑↑↓, if most of the agents follow the
prediction and sell the stocks, the stock price in the next time-step decreases
and the sellers lose the game. If most of the agents reject the prediction and
buy the stocks, the stock price in the next time step increases and the buyers
lose the game. Therefore, whether the agents make a decision of buying or
selling, those in the minority win.
Within the range of 0 < β < 1. Suppose the stock price in the time step
t is P (t), if most of the agents buy the stocks in the next time step, the stock
price in the time step t+1 should satisfy the inequality P (t+1) ≤ P (t)+√N .
In the time step t+2, because most of the agents bought the stocks in the last
time step, the probability of price increase should be less than the probability
of price decrease. Suppose most of the agents sell the stocks, the stock price
in the time step t+2 should satisfy the inequality P (t+2) ≥ P (t+1)−√N .
Only considering the equality conditions, we find that the difference between
the transaction prices in the sequential steps t + 1 and t + 2 satisfies the
equation
14
P (tsell)− P (tbuy) =
√
N(1− 2β). (11)
The above equation shows that, within the range of 0 < β < 0.5, the in-
equality P (tsell) − P (tbuy) > 0 is satisfied and the agents buying the stocks
in the time step t + 1 and selling the stocks in the time step t + 2 win the
game. Within the range of 0.5 < β < 1, the inequality P (tsell)− P (tbuy) < 0
is satisfied and the agents buying the stocks in the time step t+1 and selling
the stocks in the time step t+ 2 lose the game.
The above analysis shows that, within the range of 0 ≤ β < 0.5, the
system is like a majority game and the agents in the majority group will win
the game in the evolutionary process. Within the range of 0.5 < β ≤ 1, the
system is like a minority game and the agents in the minority group will win
the game in the evolutionary process.
4.2. Relationship between the movement of the dominant strategy and the
change of asymmetric sensitivity
To get a theoretical understanding of how the fine-to-prize ratio R affects
the movement of the dominant strategy, we firstly divide the strategies into
three groups: g = 0, g = 1
2
and g = 1. For a large value of market impact
β ∼ 1, with which the system is like a minority game, S.Hod et al have
semi-analytically concluded that, as the fine-to-prize ratio R increases, it is
the temporal oscillation that results in the suppression of extreme strategies.
In the present model, although not all the agents are active at a particular
time, the evolution of the system is also determined by the difference between
the number of agents buying the stocks and the number of agents selling the
stocks, which is similar to that in the original EMG. Therefore, asR increases,
it should be the same mechanism that results in the occurrence of a uniform
strategy distribution in the present model.
In the following, we mainly pay our attention on the small β case and
explore how the change of R can lead to the occurrence of the extreme
situations where most of the agents adopt the strategy of g ∼ 0 or g ∼ 1.
Firstly, let’s give a comparison of the scores of different strategies, g = 0,
g = 1
2
and g = 1, in the evolutionary process. Considering the case of
β = 0. If all the agents adopt the strategy g = 1
2
, the number of the
agents buying or selling the stocks is a random case and the excess demand
should be proportional to
√
N . If all the agents adopt the extreme strategy
g = 1, they will make the same decision following the prediction, the excess
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demand should be proportional to N . If all the agents adopt the extreme
strategy g = 0, they will make the same decision rejecting the prediction, the
excess demand should also be proportional to N . Because the scores of the
strategies are determined by the excess demand, the above analysis indicates
that both the score of strategy g = 0 and the score of strategy g = 1 should
be larger than the score of strategy g = 1
2
. In the present model, because
the evolution of the strategies is determined by the strategy score and the
updating threshold, with the same updating threshold, the agents are more
possible to adopt the strategies that are away from g = 1
2
.
Then, let’s have a look at the changing tendency of the critical points g<0.5c
and g>0.5c with a change of R and D. As the system has evolved to the state
where all the strategies satisfy g > 0.5. For an agent i with strategy gi, he will
win the game with probability gi and lose the game with probability 1− gi.
The average score of the strategies should be proportional to gi − (1− gi)R.
For a given population size N and a threshold D, to refrain from being
doomed in the evolutionary process, the score of strategy gi should satisfy a
minimum value
gi − (1− gi)R ∼ a(N)D, (12)
in which a(N) is determined by the population size and the time-dependent
price equation. We obtain
g>0.5i ∼
a(N)D +R
1 +R
. (13)
As the system has evolved to the state where all the strategies satisfy g < 0.5,
the agent with strategy gi will win the game with probability 1 − gi and
lose the game with probability gi, the score of strategy gi should satisfy a
minimum value
(1− gi)− giR ∼ a(N)D. (14)
We obtain
g<0.5i ∼
1− a(N)D
1 +R
. (15)
From the above two relations we find that the minimum value of | gi−0.5 |
is related to the asymmetric sensitivity parameter R and the threshold D.
Increasing R and D will lead to the increase of g>0.5i and the decrease of g
<0.5
i .
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The above analysis also indicates that the higher the value of | gi− 0.5 |, the
higher the score of the strategy gi. Therefore, with specific values of R and
D, the system will evolve to the state where nearly all the agents adopt the
extreme strategy g = 0 or g = 1, which is in accordance with the simulation
results.
5. Summary
The evolution of stock prices is related to complex correlations of various
factors, including market movement and personal sentiment. The fundamen-
tal values of the stocks are easy to be found as the market moves to its sta-
tionary equilibrium, while the trend-following movement will drive the stock
price far away from such an equilibrium. An extreme case is the occurrence
of bubbles as a rush buying is found here and there.
In the attempt to get a deep understanding of the evolutionary dynamics
of the prices in real financial markets, the minority game and its variants
have been introduced to reflect the collective behaviors of trend followers or
trend adverse. A variety of price patterns similar to that in the real markets
have been found. However, in terms of the population movement, the original
minority game does not give us a clear picture of the strategy structures. As
a modification, the evolutionary minority game has employed an adjustable
probability as the trading strategy and the population structures can be
reflected in the strategy distribution.
By incorporating market impact and asymmetric sensitivity into the evo-
lutionary minority game, we have examined the relation between the evolu-
tion of stock prices and the property of population structures under various
complex market circumstances. The coupled effects of market impact and
asymmetric sensitivity are reflected in the change of the relation between
the fluctuations of stock prices and the distribution of individual strategies.
With high market impact, an asymmetric response to gains and losses can
effectively affect the strategy distribution but not the evolution of the stock
prices. As the asymmetric sensitivity parameter R increases, the strategy
distribution changes from a U-shape distribution to a uniform distribution.
But the stock price fluctuations have no obvious change with the rise of R.
An efficient market, in which the prices are somewhat stable, occurs for high
market impact. With low market impact, both the strategy distribution
and the price fluctuations are affected by the asymmetric sensitivity. As R
increases, the system will finally evolve into the state where nearly all the
17
agents adopt the extreme strategy g = 0 or g = 1 and the price fluctuations
become large. A linear relation between the standard deviation of the stock
price changes and the average value of individual strategies exists.
Theoretical analysis indicates that the evolutionary mechanisms below
and above the critical point βc are determined by the majority-win effect
and the minority-win effect respectively. Below the critical point βc, the
majority-win mechanism makes the evolution of the stock prices become
predictable and the wealth-driven mechanism results in the movement of the
dominant strategy. Above the critical point βc, the minority-win mechanism
leads to the occurrence of a crowd-anticrowd population structure and the
occurrence of an efficient market.
By incorporating market impact and asymmetric sensitivity into the evo-
lutionary minority game, the present model can effectively reflect the majority-
minority effect in financial markets. However, the agents in the present model
have to make their choices only regarding one stock, which is different from
the situations in real financial markets where the agents can make their
choices depending upon a variety of stocks. The KPR model, a variation of
the MG model in which a macroscopic size of choices is considered as the
agents take their actions[29, 31, 32], may provide solutions to the issue. In
the future, the asymmetric sensitivity and the heterogeneous communication
structures will be further considered in the KPR and other evolutionary game
models. Exploring the potentially successful strategies in different environ-
mental conditions should be a special interest of ours.
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